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a b s t r a c t
In non-cooperative games played on highly decentralized networks the assumption that
each player knows the strategy adopted by any other player may be too optimistic or even
infeasible. In such situations, the set of players of which each player knows the chosen
strategy can be modeled by means of a social knowledge graph in which nodes represent
players and there is an edge from i to j if i knows j. Following the framework introduced
in [7], we study the impact of social knowledge graphs on the fundamental multicast cost
sharing game in which all the players want to receive the same communication from a
given source in an undirected network. In the classical complete information case, such a
game is known to be highly inefficient, since its price of anarchy can be as high as the total
number of players ρ. We first show that, under our incomplete information setting, pure
Nash equilibria always exist only if the social knowledge graph is directed acyclic (DAG).
We then prove that the price of stability of any DAG is at least 12 log ρ and provide a DAG
lowering the classical price of anarchy to a value between 12 log ρ and log
2 ρ. If specific
instances of the game are concerned, that is if the social knowledge graph can be selected
as a function of the instance, we show that the price of stability is at least 4ρ
ρ+3 , and that
the same bound holds also for the price of anarchy of any social knowledge graph (not only
DAGs). Moreover, we provide a nearlymatching upper bound by proving that, for any fixed
instance, there always exists a DAG yielding a price of anarchy less than 4. Our results open
a newwindow on how the performances of non-cooperative systemsmay benefit from the
lack of total knowledge among players.
© 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The fast and striking affirmation of the Internet has quickly shifted researchers’ attention from traditional centralized
networks to unregulated non-cooperative ones. By introducing the notion of price of anarchy as a measure of the loss of
optimality in network performances due to the selfish behavior of its users, Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [26] definitively
started the topic of Algorithmic Game Theory. Since then there has been a flourishing of results on several different models
of non-cooperative networks (see [13,33,34] for recent surveys).
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As future networking scenarios are predicted to become more and more decentralized and pervasive, new and more
stringent constraints need to be introduced in our models. For instance, the usual assumption that each player knows the
strategy played by all the other ones may be too optimistic or even infeasible. Thus, it becomes more realistic to assume
that each player is aware only of the strategies played by a subset of players representing somehow her neighborhood.
An interesting motivating discussion for this assumption in a selfish routing scenario can be found in [23] where oblivious
players are introduced which can be seen as an extreme application of this concept: they cannot feel the consequences
of other players’ choices and hence do not participate actively to the game always choosing their best strategy regardless
of what other players do. More in general, in [7] a new framework has been presented introducing the notion of social
knowledge graphs, that is, graphs having as node set the set of players in the game and in which there is an edge from i
to j if player i knows player j. According to a given social knowledge graph, the neighborhood of each node i models the
set of players of which i is aware, that is, whose chosen strategies can influence i’s payoff and hence her choices. Besides
characterizing the convergence to equilibria of better-response dynamicswith respect to the social graph topology (directed,
undirected, directed acyclic), in [7] it has been shown that the performances in load balancing and congestion games
decrease as a consequence of the stricter bounds on the players knowledge. More precisely, denoted as ∆ the maximum
outdegree of the social graph, the upper and lower bounds on the prices of anarchy and stability are shown to be linear
in∆.
The idea of modeling mutual influences among players by means of a graph was already used in graphical games [24].
However, in such a setting the graph is constructed in such a way that there is an edge from i to j if the choices of player i
may influence j’s payoff. Therefore, given a particular game, the graphical representation of [24] is completely induced by the
underlying game, while in the framework of [7] the social knowledge graph is independent and causes a redefinition of the
basic payoffs as a function of the induced mutual influences. Anyway, for analogy with [24], conventional games equipped
with social graphs are also called graphical.
In this paper we analyze the consequences of the presence of social knowledge graphs in the fundamental multicast cost
sharing game defined in [2], in which the players are network users interested in receiving the same communication from a
given source and must share the incurred communication cost. The union of the strategies adopted by each player yields a
particular solution graph, and each player’s payment or cost share is computed according to the well-known Shapley value
method [35], which equally splits the cost of each edge in the solution among all the players using it. The major drawback
of this approach, as well as of the ones yielded by other reasonable methods considered in [15], is that the corresponding
price of anarchy is equal to ρ, which makes all such methods excessively poorly performing in practice.
In order to partially cope with this problem, in [10] it is shown that the price of anarchy induced by the Shapley method
in the case in which, starting from the empty configuration, the players join the network one at a time by performing a
best response, is upper bounded by log3 ρ, a best response corresponding to a strategy selection that minimizes the player’s
incurred cost share. Moreover, in [2] it is shown that the price of stability yielded by the Shapley method is upper bounded
by Hρ . However, both these approaches require a certain degree of centralized control on the network in order to let the
players enter the game starting from the empty configuration and take their decisions in a perfectly sequential fashion, or
to ‘‘suggest’’ them a best Nash equilibrium. Again, these assumptions may not be feasible in strongly decentralized systems.
In this respect, if the presence of a social knowledge graph would be able to improve the price of anarchy of a game (as we
show indeed in our case), this might generate a useful instrument for limiting the bad effects due to the lack of cooperation
among the users without directly interfering in their decisions. Consider for instance the design of P2P protocols which
limit the visibility of the other peers, or simply, at a more foundational level, the possibility of using social graphs just as an
intermediate methodological tool for defining cost shares and payoffs so as to induce good overall performances.
Given the above observations, in this paper we analyze to which extent the presence of social knowledge graphs may
influence the performance ofmulticast cost sharing games in undirected networks. Our results are quite surprising:we show
that there exists a universal social knowledge graph lowering the price of anarchy to a value between 12 log ρ and log
2 ρ and,
more importantly, that for every fixed instance of the game there exists a social knowledge graph yielding a price of anarchy
less than 4. Unfortunately, the latter result is only existential and we cannot determine efficiently such a graph; however,
we give a polynomial time algorithm computing for each specific instance a social knowledge graph achieving a price of
anarchy less than 4r , where r is the ratio of the best possible approximation algorithm for the MinimumWeighted Steiner
Tree problem. All these bounds on the prices of anarchy and stability hold for games defined on undirected networks only.
For directed networks, in fact, it is quite easy to see that the two standard instances posing a lower bound of ρ and Hρ
respectively on the price of anarchy and stability, yield the same bounds under any social knowledge graph.
1.1. Model and definitions
In the multicast cost sharing game we are given an undirected network G = (V , E, c)with c : E → IR+, a source station
s ∈ V , a set of ρ receivers R ⊆ V and a cost sharing method distributing the cost of a solution among the receivers. Each
receiver ri wants to receive the same communication from the source s and so her set of available strategies is the set of all
the 〈s, ri〉-paths in G. Let pii be the strategy played by ri, pi = (pi1, . . . , piρ) the strategy profile (or configuration) induced
by the choices of all the receivers in the game, andΠ = ⋃ρi=1 pii be the subnetwork of G created by such choices. The cost
sharing method divides the cost c(Π) =∑e∈Π c(e) ofΠ among the receivers. We focus on the case in which c(Π) is shared
according to the Shapley value method. More precisely, if ne(pi) = |{ri ∈ R : e ∈ pii}| is the number of receivers using edge
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e, the cost share of ri in pi is defined as cost(pi, ri) =∑e∈pii c(e)ne(pi) , that is, the cost of each edge inΠ is equally shared among
all its users. We denote by I a generic instance (G, R, s) of the multicast cost sharing game.
We associate with each game a social knowledge directed graph K = (R, A) defining for each receiver ri the set Ri(K) =
{rj ∈ R : (ri, rj) ∈ A} of receivers of which ri knows the chosen path. Let ne(pi, K , ri) = |{rj ∈ Ri(K) : e ∈ pij}| + 1 be the
number of users knownby ri using edge e, ri included. Then, the cost share of ri inpi becomes cost(pi, K , ri) =∑e∈pii c(e)ne(pi,K ,ri) .
For the sake of simplicity, when clear from the context, we remove pi and K from the notation by simply writing cost(ri).
Notice that, in this new social knowledge framework, in general c(Π) ≤ ∑r∈R cost(r), that is the sum of all the cost
shares can be strictly greater than the total cost of the induced network. This can be interpreted in at least two possible
ways. First of all, given the incomplete information, one can assume that users are not able to exactly establish their cost
shares, but just presumed ones estimated by observing only the strategies played by the known users; such cost shares
provide suitable upper bounds on the actual costs that they will be finally asked to pay by the network provider. On the
other hand, such presumed cost shares might coincide with the actual final ones, thus not yielding a cost sharing method
in the strict sense, and the arising surplus
∑
r∈R cost(r)− c(Π) translates into a revenue that the provider enjoys profiting
from the users’ incomplete information.
As usual in these settings, we assume that the possible solutions for the game are all (and only) its pure Nash equilibria,
i.e. the solutions in which no agent can lower her own cost by unilaterally changing her strategy.
In order to measure the loss of optimality due to the selfish behavior of the receivers, we use the standard notions of
price of anarchy [26] and price of stability [3]. The former is defined as the ratio between the total cost of the worst pure
Nash equilibrium and the total cost of an optimal solution T ∗, given by any optimal Steiner tree connecting the subset of
vertices R∪{s}. More precisely, let N(I, K) be the set of pure Nash equilibria yielded by the social knowledge graph K on the
instance I . We define PoA(I, K) = maxpi∈N(I,K) c(Π)c(T∗) and PoA(K) = supI=(G,R,s) PoA(I, K) as the price of anarchy of K on the
instance I and the universal price of anarchy or simply price of anarchy of K , respectively. Analogously, the latter measure
is defined as the ratio between the best pure Nash equilibrium cost and the one of T ∗. More formally, we define PoS(I, K) =
minpi∈N(I,K) c(Π)c(T∗) and PoS(K) = supI=(G,R,s) PoS(I, K) as the price of stability of K on the instance I and the universal price of
stability or simply price of stability of K , respectively.
Finally, given any numbering of the receivers, let Kˆ denote the complete DAG, i.e. the graph such that A = {(ri, rj) : 1 ≤
i < j ≤ ρ}.
Multicast cost sharing games are special cases of the class of cost sharing congestion games in which a set of resources E
is given and each of the ρ players ri ∈ R has a set of strategies Si ⊆ 2E . Each resource e ∈ E has a cost c(e) which is shared
among the players using it. We call singleton cost sharing congestion games the special case in which for each player ri each
strategy belonging to Si is formed by only one resource. In what follows we will always assume that also in the cost sharing
congestion games the Shapley method is used, that is, the cost of each resource is equally shared among the players using it.
1.2. Related works
Cost sharing games have received a lot of attention and have been studied in different scenarios. Besides the multicast
case addressed in this paper, also the multi-terminal setting, in which each player wants to connect two arbitrary nodes,
and the broadcast one, that is, the restricted multicast case in which there is a receiver in each node of the network, have
been deeply considered, in both directed and undirected networks.
Shapley cost sharing games are instances of the well-known class of congestion games introduced by Rosenthal in [32].
He showed that in this class of games, any better-response dynamics converges to a pure Nash equilibrium by defining
an elegant exact potential function. Since then, several variations of the original model of congestion games have been
proposed; see, for instance, [27,29,36].
Shapley cost sharing games are highly inefficient, since a price of anarchy equal to ρ can be easily shown even in the
broadcast case on undirected networks. In [2], by exploiting the properties of Rosenthal’s potential function, it is shown that
the price of stability of Shapley cost sharing games is upper bounded by Hρ . For the broadcast case, a matching lower bound
is also given in directed networks, while, for undirected ones, a lower bound of 127 is provided in [6] and an upper bound of
O(log log ρ) is proved in [19].
For theweighted case inwhich each player i has an associatedweightwi and the Shapleymethod is extended accordingly
(each player i using an edge e is chargedwi times c(e) divided the total weight of the players using e), in [2] it is shown that
cost sharing games admit pure Nash equilibria when ρ = 2 and that for any ρ, when pure Nash equilibria do exist, the
price of stability in directed networks is Θ(max{ρ; logW }) even for the broadcast case, where W = ∑ρi=1wi. Note that,
in the weighted case, Shapley cost sharing games no longer belong to the class of congestion games, hence they are not
guaranteed to admit pure Nash equilibria. In [11], in fact, it is shown that, even for three players, there are multicast cost
sharing games on undirected networks without any pure Nash equilibrium. Finally, in [1] anΩ( logWlog logW ) lower bound on the
price of stability of multi-terminal games on undirected networks is provided.
As to the problems of existence and efficiency of strong Nash equilibria (i.e., equilibria which are resilient to deviations
by coalitions of players) in Shapley cost sharing games, in [14] it is shown that strong Nash equilibria always exist in series
parallel graphs and in extension parallel graphs for the multicast and the multi-terminal cases, respectively. Moreover,
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they show that the price of anarchy of strong Nash equilibria is O(log ρ) and is essentially tight in directed networks even
for the broadcast case. In [28], the authors consider the case in which only players sharing an edge may form coalitions. For
games on undirected networks, they show that the prices of anarchy and stability are, respectively, Θ(log ρ) and O(log ρ)
in the broadcast case, while they areΘ(ρ) and O(ρ) in the multi-terminal case. For directed networks, the price of stability
is shown to be equal toΘ(ρ) even in the multicast case. Moreover, anΩ(log ρ) lower bound on the strong price of anarchy
is provided for broadcast games on undirected networks, that is, when all coalitions are allowed. For undirected networks,
in [1] a lower bound ofΩ(
√
log ρ) on the price of anarchy is provided. For weighted games on both directed and undirected
networks the strong price of anarchy is at most 1 + lnW . A matching lower bound of Ω(logW ) is given for directed
networks, while a lower bound ofΩ(
√
logW ) is derived in undirected ones.
Existence and performances of pure Nash equilibria inmulticast cost sharing games under different cost sharingmethods
have been addressed in [6,12,15]. The last paper also evaluates the quality of the solutions achieved after a limited number
of selfish moves of the receivers in multicast games yielded by several reasonable cost sharing methods.
Finally, for Shapleymulticast cost sharing games, it is proved in [9] that theproblemof computing apureNash equilibrium
minimizing Rosenthal’s potential function is NP-hard, while it is solvable in polynomial time if the receivers are allowed to
arbitrarily split their requests among different paths. It is also shown that the price of anarchy of a pure Nash equilibrium
reached after any sequence of best responses, in the case in which the receivers enter the game one at a time starting from
the empty configuration, is between Ω( log ρlog log ρ ) and O(
√
ρ log2 ρ). These bounds have been significantly improved in [10]
to Ω(log ρ) and log3 ρ, respectively. In [10] it is also shown that the approximation ratio of the solutions obtained after a
first round of best responses of the receivers entering the game one at a time starting from the empty configuration is upper
bounded by log2 ρ.
There is also a vast literature on implementation paradigms in which cost sharing mechanisms are designed to achieve
socially desirable outcomes in spite of users selfishness. A cost sharing mechanism is a combination of an algorithm and a
cost sharingmethod. The algorithm determines the set R of receivers and computes a feasible solution allowingmulticasting
from s to R based on the utilities of each station in the network. Then, the cost sharing method specifies how to share the
cost of the computed solution among the stations belonging to R. The mechanism (and so, the algorithm) does not a priori
know the players’ utilities, because they are considered private properties of the receivers, and since receivers are selfish,
theymaymisreport utilities in order to be charged as less as possible. In such a case the service provider can discourage such
deception by using strategy-proof cost sharing mechanisms, that is mechanisms in which the dominant strategy for each
receiver is to truthfully reveal his utility no matter how the other receivers behave, and group strategy-proof mechanisms,
where this holds for coalitions as well. The interested reader may see the following References [4,5,8,16–18,20,22,25,30,31].
1.3. Our contribution
When considering the presence of social knowledge graphs, since some receivers can be hidden to other ones, multicast
cost sharing games are no longer a proper subclass of the congestion games. As a consequence, even the existence of pure
Nash equilibria is no longer guaranteed.
In fact, while the convergence to pure Nash equilibria of any better-response dynamics in the case inwhich K is a directed
acyclic graph (DAG) can be directly inferred by the results in [7], which hold for every congestion game with a DAG social
graph, we show that if K is undirected or directed cyclic, the existence of pure Nash equilibria is no longer guaranteed.
This also closes the open question raised in [7] of whether in congestion games equilibria always exist for undirected social
graphs. In fact, while such an existence was proven in case of linear latencies, we show that indeed this is not the case if the
latency functions express the Shapley cost shares. Thus, this also contributes to the general characterization picture of the
congestion games with social knowledge.
Moreover, we show that Shapley singleton congestion games are isomorphic to general potential games, i.e., any better-
response dynamics always converges to pure Nash equilibria when K is undirected, while if K is directed cyclic, convergence
to pure Nash equilibria is no longer guaranteed.
As to the impact of social knowledge graphs on the performances of multicast cost sharing games, we show that the
(universal) price of stability PoS(K) of any DAG K is always at least equal to 12 log ρ, that is PoS(I, K) ≥ 12 log ρ for at
least one instance I . Moreover, we show that the set of pure Nash equilibria induced by any complete DAG Kˆ on every
instance I coincides with the set of solutions obtained after a first round of best responses in which, starting from the empty
configuration, the receivers enter sequentially the game I according to the their topological ordering in Kˆ . Therefore, by
the results given in [10], an induced upper bound PoA(Kˆ) ≤ log2 ρ on the price of anarchy (and thus of stability) for any
complete DAG Kˆ holds.
Besides the above universal bounds, we show that there exist specific instances of the game I for which PoS(I, K) ≥ 4ρ
ρ+3
for any DAG K . The same bound holds also for the price of anarchy of every K (not only for DAGs, but also for all the other K
inducing games admitting at least an equilibrium).
On the other hand, we prove that, for any instance I , there always exists a DAG K(I) such that PoA(I, K(I)) ≤ 85 if ρ = 2
and PoA(I, K(I)) ≤ 4(ρ−1)
ρ+1 if ρ ≥ 3, hence obtaining an upper bound on the price of anarchy almost (surprisingly) matching
the lower bound on the price of stability achievable with DAGs. Unfortunately, this is only an existential result and we do
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(a) Network. (b) Knowledge graph.
Fig. 1. Non-existence of Nash equilibrium.
Table 1
Agamenot admitting a pureNash equilibrium.
PPPPPr1
r2 〈s, r3, r1, r2〉 〈s, r4, r2〉
〈s, r3, r1〉
(
1, 2826
) (
2, 78
)
〈s, r4, r2, r1〉
( 9
4 ,
29
50
) ( 15
8 ,
7
12
)
not know how to construct efficiently the graph K(I). However, we can prove that given any r-approximation of T ∗ it is
possible to compute in polynomial time, by using a simple depth first search, a DAG K(I) such that PoA(I, K(I)) ≤ 4ρ
ρ+3 r if
ρ = 2, 3 and PoA(I, K(I)) ≤ 4(ρ−1)
ρ+1 r if ρ ≥ 4.
Our achievements are twofold: On the one hand, we shed some light on how the lack of knowledge among players can
impact the total cost of the self-emerging networks created by the interactions of selfish users; on the other hand, we show
that the idea of hiding some players to others is a powerful instrument that a designer of a decentralized application can use
in order to obtain solutions whose cost may be not too far from the optimal one without directly interfering on the choices
performed by the players.
As a consequence of our study, we can conclude that the presence of social knowledge graphs can tremendously improve
the performance of multicast cost sharing games. In particular, hiding some of the players to other ones can yield better
solutions, that is, the less players know the more they are ‘‘cooperative’’.
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section we give results on the existence of and convergence to pure Nash
equilibria. In Sections 3 and 4 we present our results concerning the prices of anarchy and stability for given instances and
the universal prices of anarchy and stability, respectively. Finally, in Section 5 we give some conclusive remarks and discuss
some open questions.
2. Existence of and convergence to pure Nash equilibria
As already proved in [7], if the social knowledge graph is acyclic, in any congestion game (and thus in any multicast
cost sharing game) each better-response dynamics converges to a pure Nash equilibrium and one such equilibrium can be
efficiently computed.
Theorem 1 ([7]). In any congestion game each better-response dynamics converges to a pure Nash equilibrium when the social
knowledge graph is a DAG. Moreover, there always exists a sequence of at most n best responses which can be computed in
polynomial time ending with a pure Nash equilibrium.
We now show that if K is directed symmetric (or equivalently undirected), multicast cost sharing games may not admit
pure Nash equilibria.
Theorem 2. Multicast cost sharing games may not possess pure Nash Equilibria when the social knowledge graph is undirected.
Proof. In order to prove the theorem we give an instance of the multicast cost sharing game in which each configuration is
not a pure Nash equilibrium. Consider the instance presented in Fig. 1(a), where  represents any positive real number, and
the undirected social knowledge graph depicted in Fig. 1(b).
We say that a strategy is strictly dominant for a receiver ri if, regardless of what any other receiver does, the cost of ri
is always strictly smaller than the one obtained by choosing any other strategy. It is not difficult to observe that the edges
(s, r3) and (s, r4) are strictly dominant strategies for r3 and r4 respectively. This implies that the paths 〈s, r3, r1, ri〉 with
6 ≤ i ≤ 29, and 〈s, r4, r2, r5〉 are strictly dominant strategies for ri and r5 respectively. Specifically, in any configuration of
the game only r1 and r2 may eventually perform a selfish move.
Considering only the strategies of r1 and r2, the game can be represented in normal form as illustrated in Table 1. The
theorem follows by observing that none of the resulting four configurations is a pure Nash equilibrium. 
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It is important to note that, since each undirected graph is also a cyclic directed one (by replacing each undirected edge
{i, j}with the pairwise opposite arcs (i, j) and (j, i)), we have that also for directed cyclic graphs the existence of pure Nash
equilibria in the multicast cost sharing game is not guaranteed.
Interestingly, if we do not restrict to multicast cost sharing games, there exist instances of the Shapley congestion game
not admitting pure Nash equilibria evenwhen the social knowledge graph is a star. However, it is interesting to note that this
result does not hold if we assume players to have singleton strategy sets. In fact, we show that graphical singleton Shapley
congestion games are potential games, thus any better-response dynamics always converges to a pure Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 3. Each singleton Shapley congestion game is an ordinal potential game when K is undirected.
Proof. Given any strategy profile pi = (e1, e2, . . . , eρ)we denote by Ke(pi) the subgraph of K induced by the set of players
using resource e, i.e. Ke(pi) = (Re(pi), Ae(pi))where Re(pi) = {ri ∈ R : e = ei} and Ae(pi) = {(ri, rj) ∈ A : ri, rj ∈ Re(pi)}. For
the sake of simplicity we denote by ne(pi) andme(pi) the number of nodes and arcs in Ke(pi) and with ne(pi, ri) the number
of neighbors of ri in Ke(pi) plus 1.
The potential function establishing the result isΦ(pi) =∑e∈E Fe(pi), where
Fe(pi) = me(pi)+ ne(pi)c(e) .
Let ri be a player reducing her cost by changing her strategy from ei in pi to e′i , thus yielding a new strategy profile
pi ′ = (e1, e2, . . . , e′i, . . . , en). It is not difficult to see that Ke′i (pi) can be obtained from Ke′i (pi ′) by removing node ri and the
ne′i (pi
′, ri)− 1 edges connecting ri with its neighbors. This yields Fe′i (pi ′)− Fe′i (pi) =
ne′i
(pi ′,ri)
c(e′i)
. Similarly, we have that Kei(pi
′)
can be obtained from Kei(pi) by removing node ri and the nei(pi, ri) − 1 edges connecting ri with its neighbors. This yields
Fei(pi)− Fei(pi ′) = nei (pi,ri)c(ei) .
The change in the potential function,Φ(pi ′)− Φ(pi), is then equal to
(
Fe′i (pi
′)− Fe′i (pi)
)
+ (Fei(pi ′)− Fei(pi)) = ne′i (pi ′, ri)c(e′i) − nei(pi, ri)c(ei) > 0,
as by the selfishness of the move,
c(e′i)
ne′i (pi
′, ri)
<
c(ei)
nei(pi, ri)
. 
If K is directed cyclic, however, convergence to pure Nash equilibria is no longer guaranteed, even for best-response
dynamics.
Theorem 4. There exists a singleton Shapley congestion game induced by a directed social knowledge graph in which a best-
response dynamics may not converge to a pure Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Consider an instance with three players in which E = {e1, e2}, c(e1) = c(e2) = 1, all the players can choose
among the two resources, and the social knowledge graph is K = ({r1, r2, r3}, {(r1, r2), (r2, r3), (r3, r1)}). Let an instable
configuration be a strategy profile inwhich all the resources are used.We show that starting from any instable configuration
there exists a selfishmove leading the game to another instable configuration, thus proving the claim. Clearly in any instable
configuration exactly two players are using the same resource (the loaded resource) and the other player is using the other
one (the unloaded resource). Consider the player using the loaded resource who knows the strategy of the player using the
unloaded resource: she is paying 1 and can perform a selfish move by choosing to use the current unloaded resource, on
which she pays 12 . After such a move, we obtain a new instable configuration in which the loaded resource is the unloaded
one of the previous configuration, and vice versa. 
It is easy to see that the instance defined in the above proof admits a pure Nash equilibrium. In fact, it is open to establish
whether singleton Shapley congestion games defined on directed social knowledge graphs admit pure Nash equilibria or
not.
However, since we have shown that both cyclic directed graphs and undirected ones cannot guarantee existence of pure
Nash equilibria in graphicalmulticast cost sharing games, in the following sectionswe study the case inwhichK is aDAG. The
results given in Theorem 1, in fact, assure that in this case multicast cost sharing games always admit pure Nash equilibria.
Moreover, once fixed an instance I = (G, R, s), one such equilibrium can be constructed in polynomial time.
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3. Prices of anarchy and stability for specific instances
We first prove a lower bound holding for the price of stability of DAGs as well as for the price of anarchy of any social
graph admitting equilibria.
Theorem 5. There exists an instance I such that PoS(I, K) ≥ 4ρ
ρ+3 for any DAG K. Moreover, PoA(I, K) ≥ 4ρρ+3 for any graph K
(not only DAGs) admitting equilibria.
Proof. Consider the instance depicted in Fig. 2, where c(T ∗) = ρ(1 + ) + 3. It is not difficult to see that for any possible
social knowledge graph K the solution in which each receiver ri uses the edge (s, ri) is a pure Nash equilibrium. Hence, by
the arbitrariness of , we have PoA(I, K) ≥ 4ρ
ρ+3 . In order to prove the same bound for the price of stability of DAGs, we show
that the solution in which each receiver ri uses the edge (s, ri) is the only pure Nash equilibrium. To this aim, once fixed a
DAG K and a pure Nash equilibrium pi , number the receivers according to the topological ordering induced by K and let L
be the set of players not using their direct edge of cost 4 in pi . Let ri be the receiver with maximum index among the ones
belonging to L. Since, by the definition of ri, none of its neighbors in K belongs to L, ri’s best strategy is to choose the edge
(s, ri) thus creating a contradiction. It follows, that if K is a DAG PoS(I, K) ≥ 4ρρ+3 , by the arbitrariness of . 
We now show that for each instance I of the multicast cost sharing game there exists a complete DAG Kˆ(I) such that
PoA(I, Kˆ(I)) almost matches the above lower bound.
First of all, we need some additional notation. Once fixed an instance I , for any given Steiner tree T connecting the
set of vertices R ∪ {s}, let P iT denote the (s, ri)-path in T . Based on the topology of T , we will determine a suitable social
knowledge graph Kˆ(I, T ). T will be used to capture a subset of deviations, thus providing upper bounds on what a player
is willing to accept as individual cost in any arbitrary pure Nash equilibrium for the game defined by I and Kˆ(I, T ). Let us
number the receivers in such a way that r1 is the one at the maximum distance from s in T and the other ones follow
their order of appearance on an Eulerian tour along the doubled edges of T starting from r1. We define Kˆ(I, T ) as the
complete directed acyclic graph where the receivers are numbered according to the given ordering, that is such that
A = {(ri, rj) : 1 ≤ i < j ≤ ρ}. Given an arbitrary pureNash equilibriumpi ∈ N(I, Kˆ(I, T )) (that is, not necessarily purchasing
T ), let ζ ipi be the part of path pii that ri does not share with any receiver rj such that j > i. Clearly, it holds that c(Π) =∑ρ
i=1 c(ζ ipi ).
The next two lemmas give two different bounds that we will exploit in order to determine PoA(I, Kˆ(I)).
Lemma 6. c(Π) ≤ (ρ − 1)c(P1T )+ c(ζ 1pi ) for any pi ∈ N(I, Kˆ(I, T )).
Proof. For each edge e ∈ Π and receiver ri define coste(ri) = c(e)ne(Π,Kˆ(I,T ),ri) if e ∈ pii and coste(ri) = 0 otherwise. Let E1(Π)
be the set of edges in Π which are shared by r1 with at least one other receiver. By the definition of Kˆ(I, T ), none of the
receivers ri with i > 1 is aware of the existence of r1, hence, for each edge e ∈ E1(Π), and receiver ri such that i > 1 and
e ∈ pii, it holds coste(ri) ≥ c(e)ne(Π)−1 . By summing up for all the receivers ri such that i > 1 we obtain
ρ∑
i=2
coste(ri) ≥
∑
i>1:e∈pii
c(e)
ne(Π)− 1 = (ne(Π)− 1)
c(e)
ne(Π)− 1 = c(e).
Hence, we have
c(Π) =
∑
e∈Π
c(e) =
∑
e∈E1(Π)
c(e)+
∑
e/∈E1(Π)
c(e)
≤
∑
e∈E1(Π)
ρ∑
i=2
coste(ri)+
∑
e/∈E1(Π)
ρ∑
i=1
coste(ri)
=
ρ∑
i=2
cost(ri)+ c(ζ 1Π ).
By exploiting cost(ri) ≤ c(P iT ) ≤ c(P1T ) for each i ∈ [ρ], we get c(Π) ≤ (ρ − 1)c(P1T )+ c(ζ 1Π ). 
Lemma 7. c(Π) ≤ 4c(T )− 2c(P1T )− c(ζ 1pi ) for any pi ∈ (I, Kˆ(I, T )).
Proof. For a given I = (G, R, s), let d(r, r ′) be the distance of r and r ′ in G. By the definition of pure Nash equilibrium we
have that
cost(rρ) ≤ d(rρ, s),
cost(rρ−1) ≤ 12 cost(rρ)+ d(rρ−1, rρ),
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Fig. 2. An instance yielding PoA(K) ≥ 4ρ
ρ+3 ∀K and PoS(K) ≥ 4ρρ+3 ∀K directed acyclic.
and
cost(ri) ≤
(
cost(ri+1)− c(ζ i+1Π )
)+ 1
2
c(ζ i+1Π )+ d(ri, ri+1)
≤ cost(ri+1)− 12 c(ζ
i+1
Π )+ d(ri, ri+1).
By summing up for all the indexes belonging to Rwe get
ρ∑
i=1
cost(ri) ≤
ρ−2∑
i=1
(
cost(ri+1)− 12 c(ζ
i+1
Π )+ d(ri, ri+1)
)
+ 1
2
cost(rρ)+ d(rρ−1, rρ)+ d(rρ, s).
After rearranging and by exploiting c(Π) =∑ρi=1 c(ζ ipi ), we obtain
1
2
(
c(Π)− c(ζ 1Π )− c(ζ ρΠ )
)+ cost(r1)+ 12 cost(rρ) ≤
ρ−1∑
i=1
d(ri, ri+1)+ d(rρ, s).
The right-hand side of this inequality plus c(P1T ) is bounded from above by the length of the Eulerian tour along the
doubled edges of T according towhich the receivers are numbered. Since the length of the tour is atmost 2c(T ), by exploiting
cost(ri) ≥ c(ζ iΠ ), we get
c(Π) ≤ 4c(T )− 2c(P1T )− c(ζ 1Π ). 
By applying the last two lemmas we obtain the following powerful result.
Theorem 8. c(Π)c(T ) ≤ 4(ρ−1)ρ+1 when ρ ≥ 3 for any pi ∈ N(I, Kˆ(I, T )).
Proof. Consider the following two cases.
• c(P1T ) ≥ 4c(T )−2c(ζ
1
pi )
ρ+1 . By applying Lemma 7 we obtain
c(Π) ≤ 4c(T )− 2c(P1T )− c(ζ 1pi ) ≤ 4c(T )−
8c(T )
ρ + 1 +
4c(ζ 1pi )
ρ + 1 − c(ζ
1
pi )
= 4(ρ − 1)
ρ + 1 c(T )+
3− ρ
ρ + 1 c(ζ
1
pi ) ≤
4(ρ − 1)
ρ + 1 c(T ) for any ρ ≥ 3.
Hence, we have c(Π)c(T ) ≤ 4(ρ−1)ρ+1 for any ρ ≥ 3.
• c(P1T ) < 4c(T )−2c(ζ
1
pi )
ρ+1 . By applying Lemma 6 we obtain
c(Π) ≤ (ρ − 1)c(P1T )+ c(ζ 1pi ) <
4(ρ − 1)
ρ + 1 c(T )−
2(ρ − 1)
ρ + 1 c(ζ
1
pi )+ c(ζ 1pi )
= 4(ρ − 1)
ρ + 1 c(T )+
3− ρ
ρ + 1 c(ζ
1
pi ) ≤
4(ρ − 1)
ρ + 1 c(T ) for any ρ ≥ 3.
Hence, we have c(Π)c(T ) ≤ 4(ρ−1)ρ+1 for any ρ ≥ 3. 
Define αT = P1T ∩ P2T , βT = P1T \ P2T , and γT = P2T \ P1T . For the left over case in which ρ = 2 the following theorem holds.
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Theorem 9. c(Π)c(T ) ≤ 85 for any pi ∈ N(I, Kˆ(I, T )).
Proof. First of all note that, by the definition of Kˆ(I, T ), r1 is the receiver at maximum distance from s in T . Hence, we get
c(αT )+ c(βT ) = c(P1T ) ≥ c(P2T ) = c(αT )+ c(γT )which implies c(βT ) ≥ c(γT ).
Since pi is a pure Nash equilibrium, it holds c(P2pi ) = cost(r2) ≤ c(αT ) + c(γT ) and cost(r1) ≤ min{c(αT ) + c(βT );
1
2 c(αT )+ 32 c(γT )+ c(βT )}. Hence, we have
c(Π) ≤ cost(r1)+ cost(r2)
≤ c(αT )+ c(γT )+min{c(αT )+ c(βT ); 12 c(αT )+
3
2
c(γT )+ c(βT )}.
Consider the following two cases.
• c(αT ) ≤ 3c(γT ). We have c(Π) ≤ 2c(αT ) + c(βT ) + c(γT ). Hence c(Π)c(T ) ≤ 2c(αT )+c(βT )+c(γT )c(αT )+c(βT )+c(γT ) ≤
c(βT )+7c(γT )
c(βT )+4c(γT ) ≤ 85 since
c(βT ) ≥ c(γT ).
• c(αT ) > 3c(γT ). We have c(Π) ≤ 32 c(αT )+ c(βT )+ 52 c(γT ). Hence c(Π)c(T ) ≤
3
2 c(αT )+c(βT )+ 52 c(γT )
c(αT )+c(βT )+c(γT ) <
c(βT )+7c(γT )
c(βT )+4c(γT ) ≤ 85 since
c(βT ) ≥ c(γT ). 
The following corollaries illustrate the power of social knowledge graphs in reducing the price of anarchy of multicast
cost sharing games when the particular instance I is known in advance.
Corollary 10. For any instance I of the multicast cost sharing game there exists a complete DAG Kˆ(I) such that PoA(I, Kˆ(I)) ≤
4(ρ−1)
ρ+1 if ρ ≥ 3 and PoA(I, Kˆ(I)) ≤ 85 if ρ = 2.
Proof. By setting Kˆ(I) = Kˆ(I, T ∗), from Theorem 8 we obtain PoA(I, Kˆ(I)) = maxpi∈N(I,Kˆ(I,T∗)) c(Π)c(T∗) ≤ 4(ρ−1)ρ+1 if ρ ≥ 3 and
from Theorem 9 PoA(I, Kˆ(I)) = maxpi∈N(I,Kˆ(I,T∗)) c(Π)c(T∗) ≤ 85 if ρ = 2. 
Notice that the proven upper bounds on the price of anarchy exactly match the lower bounds holding for any social
knowledge graph when ρ = 2, 3. Moreover, for ρ > 3 the upper bounds on the price of anarchy of K(I) almost match the
lower bounds on the price of stability achievable by any DAG, which is quite a surprising result.
Since it is NP-hard to compute T ∗, we can resort to approximation algorithms for the Minimum Weighted Steiner Tree
problem in order to compute in polynomial time a DAG K(I) yielding a slightly worse price of anarchy.
Corollary 11. For any instance I of the multicast cost sharing game it is possible to compute in polynomial time a complete DAG
Kˆ(I) such that PoA(I, Kˆ(I)) ≤ 4(ρ−1)
ρ+1 r if ρ ≥ 3 and PoA(I, Kˆ(I)) ≤ 85 r if ρ = 2, where r is the approximation ratio of the best
algorithm for the MinimumWeighted Steiner Tree problem.
Proof. Let T be the Steiner tree computed by the best algorithm for the MinimumWeighted Steiner Tree problem, we have
that c(T ∗) ≥ c(T )r . By setting Kˆ(I) = Kˆ(I, T ) we obtain PoA(I, Kˆ) = maxpi∈N(I,Kˆ(I,T )) c(Π)c(T∗) ≤ maxpi∈N(I,Kˆ(I,T )) c(Π)c(T ) r ≤ 4(ρ−1)ρ+1 r
if ρ ≥ 3 because of Theorem 8 and PoA(I, Kˆ(I)) = maxpi∈N(I,Kˆ(I,T )) c(Π)c(T∗) ≤ maxpi∈N(I,Kˆ(I,T )) c(Π)c(T∗) r ≤ 85 r if ρ = 2 because of
Theorem 9. Since both T and Kˆ(I, T ) can be computed in polynomial time, the claim follows. 
4. Universal prices of anarchy and stability
From the analysis performed in the previous section it results that directed acyclic complete graphs are among the ones
yielding the lowest possible price of anarchy for the multicast cost sharing game when the instance of the game is known
in advance. We now show that such graphs achieve a good performance also when used as universal social knowledge
graphs, that is without any assumption on the given instance. We obtain such a result by exploiting the strong similarity of
the pure Nash equilibria induced by such graphs and the solutions obtained after a first round of best responses performed
sequentially by the receivers starting from the empty space. For any instance I , let FR(I)denote the set of all possible solutions
which can be obtained, starting from the empty state, after a first round of best responses performed sequentially by the
receivers (from rρ down to r1).
Theorem 12. N(I, Kˆ) = FR(I) for any instance I of the multicast cost sharing game.
Proof. Consider a pure Nash equilibrium pi ∈ N(I, Kˆ). Since the strategy adopted by any receiver ri is a best-response
strategy given the choices of all the receivers rj such that j > i, we have that pi ∈ FR(I). On the other hand, consider
a solution pi ∈ FR(I). Since each ri enters the game by performing a best response given the strategies played by all the
receivers rj with j > i and the choices performed by all the other receivers rj with j < i do not affect ri’s cost share, we have
that pi ∈ N(I, Kˆ). 
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Fig. 3. An instance yielding PoS(K) ≥ 12 log ρ for any DAG K . Only receivers of level≤ 3 are shown.
By the above theorem and the results of [10] on the social performance achieved after one round of best response moves
from empty state, the following corollary holds.
Corollary 13. PoA(Kˆ) ≤ log2 ρ .
We now provide a close lower bound on the price of stability achievable by any DAG. Our proof exploits ideas from the
lower bound construction due to Imase and Waxman [21] for the competitive ratio of the online Steiner tree problem.
Theorem 14. PoS(K) ≥ dlog ρe2 for any DAG K.
Proof. Let ρ = 2` − 1. Once fixed a DAG K , number the ρ receivers according to the topological order induced by K and
consider an instance I = (G, R, s) defined as follows. Let s be the origin of a unit length segment. We locate ri at position
1+2(i−2blog ic)
2dlog(i+1)e on the segment.We call the set {ri ∈ R : dlog(i+1)e = j} the set of receivers of level j. For any pair of consecutive
receivers along the segment there exists a straight edge in G (the one ideally belonging to the segment) of cost 1
2`
. Moreover,
for each receiver ri belonging to level j let left(i, q) and right(i, q) be the nearest receiver of level q lying respectively on the
left and on the right of ri along the segment. For each q > j there exist two curve edges (ri, left(i, q)) and (ri, right(i, q))
both having cost 12q − q. Finally, for each level j ∈ [`], letting nearest(j) be the receiver of level j closest to s, there exists the
curve edge (s, nearest(j)) of cost 1
2j
− j. A picture of I is depicted in Fig. 3 where ` = 3. We define the values j for j ∈ [`]
in such a way that j > 2j+1.
We claim that in any pi ∈ N(I, K) each receiver ri of level jmust use a curve edge starting at ri and having cost equal to
1
2j
− j thus yielding a price of stability PoS(K) ≥ ∑`j=1∑2j−1i=1 ( 12j − j) ≥ ∑dlog ρej=1 ( 12 − 2j−11) ≥ ( 12 − ρ1) dlog ρe ≈
dlog ρe
2 for the arbitrariness of 1.
We show by induction on i that if ri is of level j, ri chooses only curve edges of level not greater than j. For j = 1 this
reduces to show that the curve edge (s, r1) is the unique shortest (s, r1)-path. This easily follows by construction of the j.
Consider now a receiver ri of level j > 1. Because of the non-intersecting structure of the curve edges, each (s, ri)-path in
Gmust pass through either left(i, j − 1) or right(i, j − 1). Since the only receivers of which ri is aware are those belonging
to levels which are not greater than j and they are only using curve edges of level not greater than j, the shortest path from
ri to one of the two receivers left(i, j − 1) and right(i, j − 1) is part of a best response for ri. By construction, a curve edge
starting at ri and directly reaching left(i, j−1) or right(i, j−1) and having cost equal to 12j −j is the unique desired shortest
path. 
5. Conclusions and open problems
Following the framework introduced in [7], we have analyzed the impact of social knowledge graphs on the price of
anarchy and stability of multicast cost sharing games. In particular, we have shown that any complete DAG Kˆ lowers the
price of anarchy from ρ to log2 ρ and that, when a particular instance of the game is fixed, there exists a complete DAG
Kˆ (among the possible ρ! ones which can be obtained by considering all permutations of the receivers) yielding a price of
anarchy less than 4. Moreover, we can compute in polynomial time one complete DAG yielding a price of anarchy at most 4r
(with r ≤ 1.55). Interestingly, the presence of social knowledge graphs tremendously narrows the gap between the prices
of anarchy and stability, as we have proved close or almost matching lower bounds, that is PoS(K) ≥ 12 log ρ for every DAG
K and there exist instances I such that PoS(I, K) ≥ 4ρ
ρ+3 for every DAG K .
We stress that complete DAGs reflect the situation in which players enter sequentially the game: when player ri joins a
non-cooperative system she can get knowledge of only the i− 1 players already involved in the game and will not be aware
of those who may eventually join the system in the future. Thus, other than assuring good performances, such graphs also
have a theoretical and technical motivation.
Possible applications of our results include the design of protocols and P2P systems which limit the visibility of the other
peers, or simply, at a more foundational level, the possibility of using social graphs as an intermediate methodological tool
for defining cost shares and payoffs so as to induce good overall performanceswithout directly interfering in users decisions.
Several open problems arise from our approach.
It would be interesting to provide a more detailed characterization of the cases admitting or not pure Nash equilibria,
also by considering special combinations of social knowledge graphs and multicast networks. Moreover, as to our negative
670 V. Bilò et al. / Theoretical Computer Science 411 (2010) 660–671
results, we have given an undirected social knowledge graph for a network with 29 receivers yielding a game without
pure Nash equilibria and have shown that cyclic directed social knowledge graphs may yield games in which best-response
dynamics are not guaranteed to converge to pure Nash equilibria. What about the existence of pure Nash equilibria in this
latter case or when undirected social knowledge graphs are coupled with instances with less than 29 receivers?
As to performances of pure Nash equilibria, besides closing the gaps between the upper and lower bounds on the prices
of anarchy and stability, like theΩ(log ρ)÷ log2 ρ one on the price of anarchy in the universal case, it would be interesting
to extend our study to more general cost sharing settings, like cost sharing congestion games, and also to other graphical
games.
Moreover, since
∑ρ
i=1 cost(pi, ri) can be greater than c(Π), it would be interesting to study the surplus (defined as∑ρ
i=1 cost(pi, ri)− c(Π)) created by social knowledge graphs.
Finally, what about the effect of social graphs on the speed of convergence, that is, on the number of selfishmoves needed
to reach equilibria or on the performances achieved after a limited number of steps?
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